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1 Purpose and Character of the Book
This textbook by Christopher Tindale is the second volume in the series Critical
Reasoning and Argumentation, which series aims at providing up to date
introductory texts for use in one-semester courses with an emphasis on dialogue
and rhetoric. The first volume to appear in this series was Douglas Walton’s
Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation (2006), to which Tindale’s book has been
designed as a companion, though it could also be used besides another
argumentation text or on its own in a course dedicated to the study of fallacies.
In the preface the author states (p. xiii) that ‘the rationale behind this volume is to
introduce students to the study of fallacy by means of the latest research in the field,
along with some standard ideas that have remained relevant since the time of
Aristotle.’ Thus this textbook aspires to leave behind the usual approach of labeling
and briefly describing each fallacy, and to do so by recognizing the complexity of
fallacies as failed instances of good strategies of argumentation that can only be
appropriately evaluated when due consideration is given to the context of argument
or dialogue in which the alleged fallacy occurs. Accordingly, ‘any instance or
suspected instance of one should be treated as a unique case’ (p. xvi).
Notwithstanding the conciseness of this book, the author manages to get the
message across and to illustrate this approach by discussing more than twenty-five
types of fallacy, comprising the most frequent and the most illustrative.
Typically, a chapter or part of a chapter dealing with a particular type of
(potential) fallacy runs through the following stages:
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(1) An introduction giving a general idea of the fallacy type and some of its
history, and most often presenting a legitimate argumentative strategy of
which the fallacy constitutes a kind of aberration.
(2) Some cases that show up particular problems with the strategy.
(3) Discussion of various ways to deal with the fallacy, also illustrated by cases.
(4) A short list of critical questions that help to evaluate cases in which the
occurrence of the fallacy may be suspected, followed by a more detailed
explanation of these questions.
(5) A summary.
(6) Exercises, in which the student is asked to evaluate cases according to the
discussion and the critical questions that went before. Evaluating here means
more than labeling: in order to do justice to the discussion and the questions
one is to write a short evaluative essay and to argue for any position one takes.
2 General Comments
This book will be appreciated by many. It courageously takes serious the idea that
students should learn to see the complications inherent in arguments as they appear
in specific contexts. It nicely connects with contemporary research and provides
many references to help those that look for more. The book is attractive, well-
structured, and often captivating. It contains splendid up-to-date case material, both
in the text and in the exercises.
But does it replace the labeling approach? I rather think it presupposes, and partly
incorporates, the labeling approach. For, preliminary to a detailed evaluation that
takes in background and context, one needs to determine whether there is any
suspicion of fallaciousness, and if so of what kind. That is, an argument must, in
order to be evaluated, first be labeled, not as this or that fallacy, but as potentially
this or that fallacy (or as belonging to an argumentative strategy of which such and
such fallacies are aberrations). After that, one may proceed to see which fallacy is
actually committed (if any).
It is a pity that no examples are given of fully elaborated exercises. This makes it
hard for students to decide what exactly is expected of them. A few examples would
solve this problem. Perhaps they can be provided on the internet.
The critical questions form the corner-stone of the whole approach. But there are
two fallacies for which they are missing: Irrelevant Conclusion and the Fallacy of
Argument from Consequences. Ad verecundiam has two sets of questions. The
second set is mainly a refinement of the first, but leaves out the second question of
the first set (‘Did the authority make the attributed claim?’, p. 133). So one actually
needs both sets.
Among the references, there are many to the pragma-dialectical standard theory,
but none to the pragma-dialectical integrated theory (the theory of strategic
maneuvering) that incorporates rhetorical insights (van Eemeren and Houtlosser
1999; 2002). This is a bit surprising, since the author is clearly concerned with
strategies and with contextual settings, as is the integrated theory.
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3 Specific Comments
The list below contains a number of more detailed comments that could be useful
for instructors using the book or for preparing a second edition.
1. (p. 12) According to Tindale not all fallacies are misuses of legitimate
strategies, and he adduces Straw Man as a counterexample. ‘There seems no
clear way that we can judge this the counterside to some legitimate
argumentative strategy, unless we conjure up something trivial such as ‘‘Real
Man’’.’ But Real Man is not so trivial, considering how hard it is to correctly
explicitize the implicit elements in one’s opponent’s position. Straw Man can
be seen as a ‘derailment’ of such explicitization strategies.
2. (p. 43) In a passage discussing the difficulties of applying rules for validity
and invalidity, there is a surprising reference to Gerald Massey, which says
that he was ‘concerned that we can rarely decide that premises are all true and
the conclusion false because we are not clear how to prove this.’ That is,
according to Massey, what he calls ‘the trivial logic-indifferent method’ can
rarely be applied to show invalidity. But since this method (showing the
premises to be all true and the conclusion false) is not the most common way
to show that arguments are invalid, the reader may be at a loss about what
Massey’s concern implies for the possibilities of establishing invalidity. For
this, one needs to know that, according to Massey, there is no other method to
do so that has theoretical legitimacy. But familiarity with Massey’s position
can not be assumed in an introductory text. Also, it should not be taken for
granted that Massey was right. Actually, Massey’s claim can be refuted: there
are other bona fide methods of establishing invalidity (Krabbe, 1995). Which
is not to say that Tindale’s point about the difficulties of applying rules for
validity and invalidity is mistaken.
3. (pp. 44, 45) When explaining Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, Tindale
notes that there are not only valid, but also ‘false or invalid syllogisms’.
Though this way of speaking is contrary to Aristotle’s parlance, it conforms to
contemporary usage of these terms (I would much prefer ‘invalid’ to ‘false’,
though). However, the quote from Aristotle that follows (‘A false syllogism
cannot be drawn from true premises’) is incomprehensible. Suspecting a
misprint, I searched at the indicated location (Anal. Pr. II.16, 64b), but failed
to locate the quote. Perhaps the intention was to refer to an earlier passage
(Anal. Pr. II.2, 53b) in which Aristotle claims that from true premises one
cannot syllogize a falsehood (i.e., validly draw a false conclusion). But this
passage does nothing to show that there are, in Aristotle’s terminology, invalid
syllogisms. When we would say that there was an invalid syllogism, Aristotle
would say that there was no syllogism.
4. (p. 60) The case of the dog and the puppies (Plato’s Euthydemus 298D-E) is
described as ‘a classic case of Equivocation’. There is nothing against treating
this case from that angle, but it should be mentioned that Aristotle does not
refer to it as a fallacy dependent on language, but as a fallacy of accident,
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which is one of the types of fallacy not depending on language (SE 24, 179a
34–35, b 14–15).
5. (p. 63) I have some doubts about the way the critical questions for
Equivocation have been formulated. We can say that terms or phrases retain or
do not retain their meaning, but can this be said for concepts? Can concepts
‘have a shift in meaning’ as is written lower on the same page? Rather it
seems that concepts are meanings and that a term shifts in meaning when it
starts to denote another concept. But if concepts are meanings, then they do
not retain their meaning, nor do they shift in meaning. (Of course there are
other concepts of ‘concept’ the author could wish to put forward.) In the
second critical question (‘Does any shift of meaning indicate that the
conclusion fails to prove what it was supposed to prove?’) the word
‘conclusion’ should perhaps be replaced by ‘argument’.
6. (pp. 63, 64) Equivocation problems in the premises are deemed less serious
than those that involve the conclusion. I see no reason for this. Take, for
instance, the problem of an ambiguous middle term, where different senses for
the two occurrences are needed to make each premise acceptable, but an
identical sense is needed to make the reasoning valid. In some cases this
cannot be remedied.
7. (p. 76) Charles Hamblin’s identification of the origins of Begging the
Question has been distorted when the situation is described as one in which
‘one person asks another to grant a certain premise on which to build a point,
but then proceeds to act as if the granted premise has actually been proved.’
Hamblin writes: ‘The Fallacy consists in asking to be granted the question-at-
issue, which one has set out to prove’ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 33). Accordingly,
the fallacy is committed by the Questioner, when asking for the point to be
proved (from granted premises) to be granted itself as a premise. This
precedes the syllogism that ‘proves’ the point.
8. (p. 118) Among the examples of reasonable uses of ad ignorantiam the case of
scientific disconfirmation (a hypothesis being tested with a negative result) is
less than convincing. Not because it would be an unreasonable kind of
reasoning, but because it is not an Argumentum ad ignorantiam, being based
straightforwardly on knowledge (the outcome of the test) rather than a lack of
knowledge. A better example is obtained, in a Popperian way, when a
hypothesis has been thoroughly tested and passed all tests (‘has proved its
mettle’). This does not prove the hypothesis, but the acceptance of the
hypothesis is then based upon a reasonable kind of ad ignorantiam.
9. (pp. 133, 135) The third critical question for ad verecundiam on p. 133 (‘Are
the authority and claim made relevant to the subject matter?’) covers two
issues: (1) Does the claim made by the authority belong to this authority’s
field of expertise? (2) Is the claim relevant for the point the arguer wants to
prove? The question is reformulated more clearly on p. 135. Nevertheless, it
remains confusing to have these two issues in one question. Moreover, the
second issue does not belong to the argument from authority proper but to the
argument leading from the authority’s claim to the arguer’s ultimate point.
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10. (pp. 155–157) It is good to have a section on The Gambler’s Fallacy and
related fallacies, and to discuss the work of Tversky and Kahneman, but their
concepts (representativeness, availability, adjustment, anchoring) should be
better explained so that the reader may apply them to a case like 8C.
After this list, in which some of the weaker spots in the text were discussed, one
may have the false impression that this text is not a good choice for use in the
classroom. But I do, on the contrary, think that it would be a good choice. Weak
spots, moreover, can be repaired. They can also occasion stimulating discussions.
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